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GUILTY PLEA NEGOTIATIONS AND THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE OF
EVIDENCE: A CASE STUDY OF CHICAGO NARCOTICS COURTS*
J.A. GILBOY**
The exclusionary rule makes inadmissible at a
criminal trial evidence obtained by law enforcement
officers in violation of the defendant's constitutional
rights.' However, a very large number of criminal
cases are terminated not through trials but rather
through pleas of guilty. 2 An examination of the way
in which the exclusionary rule operates in these latter
cases is critical to an understanding of the actual
impact of the rule on the criminal justice system.
Some legal commentators have speculated that in
guilty plea negotiations the prosecutor may fre-
quently offer the defendant a more attractive, that is
more lenient, sentence if the defense agrees to forego
* The author wishes to thank John R. Schnidt, Esq. for
his critical reading of various drafts of this paper. She
gratefully acknowledges the assistance provided by Assist-
ant State's Attorney Mike Simkin and the other prosecu-
tors who generously gave of their time and energy to an-
swer numerous questions, and by Robert Grossman, As-
sistant Supervisor, First Municipal District Criminal
Department, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County,
for the opportunity to compile court statistics.
The author is indebted to the Department of Sociology
and Herbert Jacob of the Department of Political Science at
Northwestern University for their financial support of the
author's doctoral dissertation research. The data reported
here were collected while working on that larger research
project. Preparation of a revision of this paper was
supported in part by a National Institute of Mental Health
Grant (MH 13112-01) to the Department of Psychiatry,
Duke University.
**J. A. Gilboy is currently a post-doctoral fellow in the
Departments of Sociology and Psychiatry at Duke Uni-
versity.
'The exclusionary rule, as applied to unlawful searches
and seizures, was first enunciated in Weeks v. United.
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), wherein the Supreme Court
held that in a federal prosecution the fourth amendment
barred the use of evidence obtained through an illegal
search and seizure. In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961),
the rule was extended to the states through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. This article deals only
with the application of the exclusionary rule to narcotics
cases in which searches and seizures fail to comply with
fourth amendment requirements.2
It is estimated that guilty pleas constitute approxi-
mately 90 per cent of all convictions. See generally D.
NEWMAN, CONVICTION-THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT
OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966); PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 9 (1967).
the filing of a motion to suppress evidence illegally
obtained by the police. I It has been suggested that
such practices may lead to a wholesale abandonment
of motions to suppress illegal evidence even where
the motions have substantial merit because "when
the benefits of a guilty plea are made attractive
enough, even the slightest doubt concerning the
validity of a procedural defense may lead to
compromise."' Such practices may be regarded as
unfair because "[a] lleged infringements of vital con-
stitutional rights ought not be the occasion of re-
duced sentences that give a discount to the guilty and
an almost irresistible bargain to those who probably
could not be convicted."' The alleged existence of
such practices also has a bearing on the current
debate concerning the impact of the exclusionary rule
in deterring illegal police practices.' For example,
the absence of a demonstrable deterrent impact may
be explained by defenders of the rule as attributable
in part to wide-spread "evasion" of effective judicial
enforcement by plea bargaining practices .
7
In 1970 Professor Dallin Oaks stated that "[tihe
3 See Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargain-
ing, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50,79-82 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as Alschuler]; Burns, Mapp v. Ohio: An All-American
Mistake, 19 DE PAUL L. REV. 80, 96 (1969); Oaks,
Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37
U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 748-49 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Oaks]; Rosett, The Negotiated Guilty Plea, 374 ANNALS 70,
73 (1967). See generally H. PACKER, THE LIMIrrs OF
CRIMINAL SANCTION 221-26 (1968).
'Alschuler, supra note 3, at 81.
'Oaks, supra note 3, at 748. For a contrasting opinion
see White, A Proposal for Reform of the Plea Bargaining
Process, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 439, 458-62 (1971).
'For a 1970 survey of research on the effectiveness of the
exclusionary rule in deterring illegal police behavior see
Oaks, supra note 3. A more recent examination of this issue
appears in Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing
Health? Some New Data and a Plea Against a Precipitous
Conclusion, 62 KY. L.J. 681 (1974). See also Spiotto,
Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusion-
ary Rule and Its Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUDIES 243
(1973) and a thorough critique of this recent research in
Critique, On the Limitations of Empirical Evaluations of
the Exclusionary Rule: A Critique of the Spiotto Research
and United States v. Calandra, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 740
(1974).
'See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 3, at 82, 83.
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numerical importance and current interest in the
question of plea bargaining and sentencing should be
a strong incentive for empirical inquiry to determine
the true relationship between these subjects and the
exclusionary rule."' However, no such studies have
appeared.' This article examines the subject with
respect to events in Chicago's two narcotics courts. "
The focus is on the nature of the relationship
between plea negotiation and the exclusionary rule of
evidence as it is portrayed in the comments and
actions of prosecutors in those courts.
The materials on which this study is based were
gathered during 1974 as part of a larger study. They
are composed of thirty-one days of observations of
court hearings and plea negotiations, " and inter-
views with six prosecutors who were associated with
the court during the period of research. These
prosecutors were asked to discuss their specific
practices in cases which had been observed and to
describe their general approach to prosecuting cases
with evidentiary issues. The interviews were open-
ended, focusing, among other things, on the prosecu-
tors' personal views and practices. Additional mate-
rials about the practices of prosecutors were gathered
from contacts with defense lawyers, whose descrip-
tions of practicing law in the narcotics courts were an
invaluable source of information.
THE SETTING OF PLEA NEGOTIATIONS IN THE
NARCOTICS BRANCH COURTS
In Chicago two "branch" courts have been spe-
cially created to handle narcotics offenses. " Prelimi-
'Oaks, supra note 3, at 749.
'There is very little information concerning the waiver
of procedural defenses as an object of guilty plea negotia-
tions. Fragmented information from Los Angeles suggests
the litigation of procedural issues in that city precedes, and
is independent of, guilty plea negotiation. See Alschuler,
supra note 3, at 82 n.73 and Mather, Some Determinants of
the Method of Case Disposition: Decision-Making by
Public Defenders in Los Angeles, 8 LAW & Soc'Y REV.,
187, 193 (1974).
"In considering the relationship of plea negotiation and
the exclusionary rule in Chicago, several commentators
have suggested that the litigation of procedural issues
appears to precede plea negotiation in that city. See
Alschuler, supra note 3, at 81 n.73; Oaks, supra note 3, at
688.
"The observations of plea negotiations in the narcotics
courts were conducted during February, March, April, and
June 1974. Interviews with the prosecutors in the narcotics
courts were held during this period as well as in subsequent
months of 1974.
"Branch Court 25 hears cases from the south side of
Chicago as well as cases of the police department's vice
control unit. Branch Court 57 hears cases from the north
side of Chicago and cases of the Illinois Bureau of
Investigation and the Metropolitan Enforcement Group.
nary matters in felony narcotics cases-preliminary
hearings, the setting of bond, motions to suppress
evidence on constitutional grounds-are heard in
these branch courts. Pleas of guilty to felony informa-
tions and to felony charges reduced to misdemeanors
also occur in the branch courts. Trials in felony cases
take place in different courts. In misdemeanor
narcotics cases, however, bench trials as well as
preliminary matters take place in the branch
courts. "
The Cook County state's attorney's office assigns
to these two narcotics branch courts one supervisor
and a total of four to five assistant state's attorneys.
The assistants are authorized by the supervisor to
handle plea negotiations in misdemeanor cases and
certain lesser felonies. In more serious felony cases,
plea negotiation is handled by the supervisor."'
Plea negotiations with the supervising state's
attorney usually occur on the day in which the
preliminary hearing or the hearing on a motion to
suppress evidence takes place in the narcotics courts.
Occasionally, however, the supervisor is approached
a few days earlier. The negotiation takes place in a
small room adjacent to one of the courts. 15 The room
houses the desks of the state's attorney supervisor, his
assistants, and the court police sergeant; it is usually
crowded and noisy. Since the assistants carry out
almost all of the work in the courtroom itself in both
felony and misdemeanor cases, when a defense
attorney approaches the supervising state's attorney
about a possible guilty plea the supervisor usually
has no idea what the case is about. ' 6 The supervisor
refuses to discuss any case until he has before him the
defendant's "rap sheet," a list of the defendant's
prior arrests and convictions. Copies of the police
reports and search warrant, if any, are also consid-
"Defendants requesting a jury trial are sent to one of
the two misdemeanor jury trial courts. It should be pointed
out, however, that such transfers are seldom requested.
"The bulk of plea negotiations by the assistant state's
attorneys involved marijuana cases. In "controlled sub-
stances" cases, the supervising state's attorney conducted
the plea negotiations. See generally Cannabis Control Act,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 561/2, §§ 701 et seq. (1975) and Con-
trolled Substances Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 561/2, §§
1100 el seq. (1975).
"Plea negotiations were observed for fifteen days in
the supervising state's attorney's office. Verbatim notes of
plea negotiations and other conversations were made during
this period.
"The assistant state's attorneys conducted the prelimi-
nary hearings in felony cases, and hearings on motions to
suppress evidence and quash search warrants in mis-
demeanor and felony cases. The outcomes of these proceed-
ings were then made known to the supervisor through a
check sheet attached to the state's attorney's office file on
each case.
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ered essential. In addition, the arresting police officer
is usually present; he may be asked questions by the
supervisor and sometimes by the defense lawyer as
well.
During the supervisor's review of the case the
defense lawyer will often add comments elaborating
on a point or modifying the police officer's statements
with information supplied by his client, sometimes
relaying a story completely different from the police
officer's. Occasionally the defendant may be brought
into the office on the request of the supervising state's
attorney or on the initiative of the defense lawyer.
When this occurs there usually has been some
suggestion by the defense lawyer that the defendant
be treated differently than the "usual" defendant in
such a case. The supervisor will listen to the
defendant's special plea, such as a serious illness
which would create a hardship if he went to the
penitentiary for a lengthy period. The defendant is
then asked to leave the office and the supervisor will
give the defense attorney the state's offer if the client
will plead guilty. 17
The setting for plea negotiation with the assistant
state's attorneys is different and in most cases takes
place in open court. 18 When a case is called, the
defense lawyer, his client, and the arresting officer
will approach the bench. The assistant state's attor-
ney will briefly read to himself the police officer's
arrest report and direct any questions he has to the
officer who is standing next to him. He may then
lean over and whisper to the defense lawyer or vice
versa. The case may be delayed for a few minutes
7Plea negotiations directly between the prosecutors and
defendants were not observed. One special form does exist,
with the police officer in the case as an intermediary. It may
be suggested by the police to the defendant that if he
cooperates in revealing the identity of his dealer or other
persons in the chain of supply, the prosecutor may offer him
a lesser sentence or altogether drop the charges pending
against him. In this regard, it should be noted that plea
negotiation between prosecutors and defendants, prior to
the appointment of counsel, is not unusual in certain areas
of the country. See Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compro-
mises by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L.
REv. 865, 904 (1964). Whether plea negotiations with
defendants in these jurisdictions are used by the prosecution
to avoid scrutiny and litigation of evidentiary claims by
defense lawyers cannot be stated with certainty at this time.
"Observations of court proceedings and the work of
assistant state's attorneys were made on seven days in
Branch Court 25 and eight days in Branch Court 57. In
both courts, court proceedings were observed from a seat
next to the judge's bench. During court recesses, when
prosecutors and defense lawyers were not being interviewed
about specific cases that had been observed, this observer
was in the judge's chambers listening to conversations
between the judge and prosecutors and an occasional
defense lawyer who came back to the chambers.
until the assistant has had more time to talk with the
defense lawyer, or the assistant may immediately
announce the results of their previous plea negotia-
tions, either that an agreement has been reached and
the defendant will plead guilty, or that they are
unable to reach any agreement on an acceptable
sentence. While cases are being prosecuted by one
assistant state's attorney, the other may be standing
back a little way from the judge's bench discussing
cases with defense lawyers who have approached him
or whom he may have approached about offers in
their cases. The sentencing offers made by the
assistants are not totally discretionary. Guidelines for
plea negotiation are established by the supervising
state's attorney which set forth the minimum amount
of probation and jail time the assistant may offer in
certain types of cases and also set forth the routine
reductions from felony to misdemeanor charges
which will be allowed to defendants. "
VOLUNTARY DISMISSALS OF CASES APART FROM
PLEA NEGOTIATIONS
As a preliminary matter, it may be noted that,
even before any plea negotiations had taken place,
prosecutorial policies observed in the Chicago nar-
cotics courts to some extent reflected the existence of
prospective claims that the evidence had been ille-
gally seized. The screening of cases for such claims
"The existence of guidelines is itself a limit on the
"attractiveness" of a sentence the assistant state's attorneys
could offer a defendant on a guilty plea in a marijuana case.
The following are guidelines for marijuana actions:
Marijuana possession
(1) Possession of 30 to 250 grams of marijuana to be
reduced to a Class A misdemeanor (from a Class 4
felony) whether or not there is a plea of guilty.
(2) Possession of 250 grams to approximately 1000
grams of marijuana to be reduced to a Class A
misdemeanor (from a Class 4 or 3 felony) in cases
for plea of guilty only. A minimum sentence of
straight probation to be given to the defendant.
(3) Possession of over 1000 grams to 5 pounds to be
reduced to a Class A misdemeanor (from a Class 3
felony) in cases for a plea of guilty only. A
minimum sentence of straight probation and jail
time.of 30 days of jail or more to be given.
Marjuana Deliveries
(At the beginning of the research the state's attorney's
office policy was to seek jail time. Later they were
allowed to accept pleas of guilty to straight probation
in some cases.)
Plea negotiation guidelines are unusual for a prosecutor's
office. In one questionnaire study 70 per cent of the
prosecutor's offices responding had not established any
formal rules or procedures with respect to plea negotiation.
See Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by Prosec-
utors to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 865, 900
(1964).
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occurred at two stages: (1) after the police had filed
charges in the branch court but prior to any court
hearing in the case; and (2) after a finding of
probable cause at a preliminary hearing in a felony
case but prior to the case being bound over for
consideration by the grand jury.
Approximately 55 per cent of all charges initially
filed in the narcotics courts were voluntarily with-
drawn from further prosecution by the state's
attorney. 20 This high proportion of cases voluntarily
dismissed reflects in part the absence in Chicago of
any prosecutorial screening of cases prior to the time
the police file charges in the narcotics courts. 2 In a
handful of the observed cases defense lawyers went to
the supervisor, who was in his office, to ask that a
case be dismissed.22 Most of the screening and
dismissal of cases, however, was done in court by the
assistants who performed this function in all cases,
regardless of the seriousness of the charge. From one
to as many as seven cases a day, involving one or
more defendants and charges, were observed to be
o An examination of charges disposed of during Novem-
ber-December 1973 reveals that of the 4460 ordinance,
misdemeanor and felony charges disposed of, 246.0 or about
55 per cent of the charges were dismissed by the state's
attorneys in the narcotics branch courts. Statistics were
calculated from the Daily Court Sheets of the Municipal
Department of the Circuit Court of Cook County. On these
sheets judges daily record their findings and dispositions for
every defendant heard by the court that day. See Table I.
Some of the 4460 charges dismissed by the prosecutor in
the narcotics courts would probably have never reached
the courts if a pre-charge screening process existed.
Charges with substantial evidentiary issues, for instance,
could be recognized at the pre-charge screening stage.
Other dismissals of charges, however, would probably not
be affected by pre-charge screening, as where charges are
dismissed after a laboratory analysis of the alleged drug
discloses no narcotic content or the defendant produces a
prescription. No study exists which evaluates the relative
importance of these various reasons in the dismissal of
charges in Chicago's narcotics courts. For such a study of
dismissals in New York City see S. Cooper, Dismissal of
Narcotics Arrest Cases in the New York City Criminal
Court, 1970 (paper reproduced by the Rand Corporation).
2'For many years the state's attorney's office in Cook
County did not review any felony charges prior to the filing
of the complaints in court. See McIntyre, A Study of
Judicial Dominance of the Charging Process, 59 J. CRIM.
L.C. & P.S. 463 (1968). At the time of the study, the police
needed the approval of the state's attorney's office before
filing felony charges in cases of "violent felonies" such as
rape, murder, aggravated battery, and armed robbery.
However, they did not need this approval in narcotics, auto
theft, and forgery cases.
22See Table II (c). In eight of the cases observed, de-
fense lawyers either prior to or after the preliminary hear-
ing approached the supervising state's attorney to have
the case dismissed.
TABLE I
DISPOSITION OF ORDINANCE, MISDEMEANOR AND
FELONY CHARGES IN CHICAGO'S NARCOTICS BRANCH
COURTS 25 AND 57, NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1973
PerCent
Held to the GrandJury 136 3.05
Dismissed
Dismissed for Want of Prosecution 151 3.39
Leave to File Denied 172 3.86
Non-Suit 472 10.58
Discharged 2 .04
Negative Lab Report 257 5.76
Nolle Prosequi 25 .56
Stricken on Leave to Reinstate 1381 30.96
TOTAL 2460 55.15
Discharged
Motion to Suppress/to Quash Sustained 674 15.11
No Probable Cause at a Preliminary 96 2.15
Hearing
Misdemeanor Trial-Discharged 65 1.46
TOTAL 835 18.72
Findings and Pleas of Guilty, Supervision
State's Attorney Drug School-Supervi- 239 5.36
sion
Misdemeanor Trial-Finding of Guilty 61 1.37
Pleas of Guilty
Felony Informations 173 3.88
Misdemeanor Pleas of Guilty 556 12.47
TOTAL 1029 23.08
TOTAL 4460 100.00
voluntarily dismissed by the assistants. Typically
after a case was called by the court clerk, the assistant
state's attorney read through the police officer's case
report and directed questions to the officer. In many
cases where charges were dismissed, the defendant
had not yet retained or been appointed counsel and
the screening of cases was initiated entirely by the
prosecutor. 23 In some instances the assistant an-
nounced the decision to dismiss the case with a brief
explanation to the judge such as "a bad search" or
"because of the manner in which the police gained
the contraband." 24
2 The judge in Branch 25 was also observed initiating
review of the police officer's arrest and search in a handful
of cases. After reading the complaint against the defendant
and questioning the police officer about the case he would
tell the defendant, "If you had an attorney he'd make a
motion to suppress and I'd sustain it." The state immedi-
ately dismissed the charges in such cases.
2' But time pressures may operate to limit the number of
cases in which the prosecutor can review and dismiss
charges involving illegal searches and seizures. One assist-
ant reported to the researcher that the court call in one of
the narcotics courts moved along so quickly it was some-
[Vol. 67
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The screening of cases by the prosecutor fre-
quently occurred at a later stage in a case. In several
of the observed cases questions about how the police
had conducted their search emerged after testimony
at the preliminary hearing. For example, the police
officer might have made one statement at the prelimi-
nary hearing and another in his written police
reports. In such a case the defense lawyer might
bring his case to the supervisor's office and the
supervisor would review the matter and decide to
dismiss the case.2
Prosecutors indicated that they were generally
cautious about "sticking their necks out" to volun-
tarily dismiss a case, and that if there was any
question about it they were inclined to allow the case
to go to trial. Each day the assistants were required
times difficult for him to read through all of the police
reports carefully and to question the police officer before the
judge disposed of the case. What occurred in these cases was
that the judge, after looking at the complaint against the
defendant (who was not represented by counsel at the time)
and seeing that the case involved, for instance, a small
amount of marijuana, would offer the defendant a dis-
chargeable misdemeanor probation if he would plead
quilty. Cannabis Control Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 562,
§ 710 (1975). If the assistant had not reviewed the case in
time he would allow the defendant to decide for himself
whether "he was guilty" rather than attempt to apply any
standard of the admissibility of the evidence at trial.
Interview with an assistant state's attorney, Mar. 25,
1974.
"5As illustrated in the following interview with an
assistant state's attorney, a blend of considerations under-
lies the practice of dismissing cases with evidentiary claims
prior to any plea negotiations, including: fairness to
defendants, the expectation that defense lawyers will pro-
ceed on their motions regardless of an offer, and lack of time
by prosecutors to conduct widespread plea negotiations.
Q: "How do you decide whether to "SOL" a case?"
A: "Well, it's based on your criminal law course in
law school. Do you have the evidence? Does the
state have the evidence, based on your knowledge
of working in the courts as to whether you'd win
the case. It's a matter of expedience. These are
cases that if they were put on, the judge would sus-
tain the motion."
Q: "Is it not possible to give a very good offer to
encourage a plea of guilty?"
A: "Most defense lawyers know. They'd put on their
motion, what do they have to lose if they put on
their motion? Now if we made one offer if he put
on the motion and one offer after he put it on, but
we're not playing games with defense lawyers.
We're fair to them. This isn't a poker game, we're
not playing games, 'I'll give you this if you do
this.' We don't have the time to do that, to be
playing games."
Interview with assistant state's attorney, Nov. 7, 1974.
to prepare a list of the final dispositions of cases in
court and give a one-line explanation for the particu-
lar disposition. Several assistants stated that if there
were too many voluntary dismissals they would
receive complaints from their superiors who review
these sheets. Nevertheless, whatever the limitations
on these practices it is clear that, apart from any plea
negotiations, some cases with clearly substantial
evidentiary claims were winnowed out and volun-
tarily dismissed by the prosecutors. 16
PROSECUTORIAL POLICIES ON PLEA NEGOTIATIONS
IN RELATION TO THE ExcLusiONARY RULE
The supervisor of the two branch courts stated
flatly that he rarely requires as a condition of his plea
bargain offer that the defense forego making a motion
to suppress evidence in the case. The supervisor's
position on the subject was that his offers were based
on the type of offense the defendant has committed,
the defendant's personal background, prior criminal
record, and any other mitigating and aggravating
circumstances in the case:
Usually I do not object (if the lawyer proceeds on his
motion to suppress evidence in court after being given
-an offer) because I'd be discriminating. If I gave an
offer after the preliminary hearing and after the
motion to suppress, taking your question to the logical
conclusion those offers should be harsher. I don't think
that's fair. The offer should be based on the type of
case and the aggravating and mitigating factors.27
There are independent sources of information,
apart from the stated policy, to warrant a similar
conclusion about the practices of the supervisor. An
important feature of plea negotiation was that the
supervisor did not maintain control over its initia-
tion. Assistant state's attorneys, for example, were
"In other cities, the exclusionary rules of evidence may
also have an effect at the earlier stage of pre-charge
screening. See F. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION
TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A CRIME 23, 40-41 (1970).
27 Interview with the supervising state's attorney, June 5,
1974.
In a later conversation this supervisor again reiterated
his attitude:
I'm going to be a defense lawyer some day. You have
to give the defendant some leeway even though he's
guilty. He has rights, and he should be allowed to
have his motion to suppress heard. Now I know state's
attorneys in the office who don't think so and won't
even negotiate after a preliminary hearing. They send
it to the trial level. I don't feel this way. My offer
stood until the case went to the grand jury.





Evidentiary Motions Litigated Prior to Plea Negotiations
(a) Prosecutor tells defense lawyer that if he had negotiated the case before the motion was made 0
his client would not now be being penalized for making the motion.
(b) Prosecutor does not discuss the sentence implications of having made the motion prior to plea 6
negotiations.
Evidentiary Motions Available to be Litigated
(c) Possible motion discussed, case dismissed without any plea negotiation. 8
(d) Possible motion discussed, case dismissed after attempt at plea negotiation. 0
(e) Possible motion discussed, a sentencing offer made if the defendant pleads guilty, and defense 7
told to make his motion in court if he wants to.
(f) Possible motion mentioned by defense, prosecutor does not mention offer based on foregoing 5
motion.









not instructed to, nor did they, intervene and pres-
sure defense lawyers to take their cases to the
supervisor to be negotiated before making motions
to suppress evidence in court. Such a practice might
be expected to exist if the supervising state's attorney
was intent on negotiating pleas in all cases with
motions to suppress. In practice, the cases nego-
tiated were those brought to his attention by de-
fense lawyers who came to his office. This role of
the defense lawyer limited the number of cases with
evidentiary issues which reached the plea negotiation
stage.
In cases which were brought to his office by
defense lawyers, the supervisor mentioned to the
lawyers his reasons for the particular sentence
offered-for instance, that the defendant had an
extensive criminal record, or had been in possession
of or had been selling a large amount of narcotics.
The fact that the lawyer had already proceeded in
court with a motion to suppress was never mentioned
as part of these rationales. 2" If the supervisor were in
fact interested in utilizing plea bargaining to control
the number of motions to suppress filed in court, it
might be expected that he would communicate to
defense lawyers the policy of making a harsher sen-
tencing offer after such motion was made. 29 Fur-
thermore, in most cases where the defense lawyer
had not yet made such a motion, but planned to do so
after the offer was advanced, and made this known to
the prosecutor, the supervisor did not attempt to
28 The plea negotiations in ninety cases were observed.
In thirty-one of these either the supervisor or the defense
lawyer mentioned during negotiations that there was
pending in the case a motion to quash a search warrant or a
motion to suppress. The prosecutor's responses to this
information appear in Table II.
29See Table II (a).
discourage the lawyer from doing so by indicating
that his offer was based on the lawyer's agreement to
forego such motion.3 '
A similar conclusion about the practices of the
supervisor could be drawn from other observations of
plea negotiation between defense lawyers and the
supervisor. The defense lawyers, for instance, were
prevented by the supervisor from basing their plea
negotiations on the argument that they might prevail
on a motion to suppress. If the supervisor was faced
with such an argument, he was likely to encourage
the defense lawyer to go to court and present his
motion. "i
Despite the supervisor's stated policy and the
practices which are described above, in three of the
observed cases the supervisor conditioned his sen-
tencing offer on the defense lawyer's agreement to
forego the motion to suppress evidence. 12 Upon
questioning, he explained that in one of the cases he
was very irritated with the lawyer and his client
because they were "playing games" with him; the
lawyer in particular demonstrated that he was
"untrustworthy" when he told the supervisor he was
going to do one thing in the case and then proceeded
in court to do something entirely different. In the
second case, the police indicated a special desire to
obtain a conviction; and in the third case, the
supervisor's own desire to assure a conviction ap-
peared to be a motivating factor. The existence of
such deviant cases is not unexpected given that the
plea negotiation policies involved are entirely a
creation of the supervisor. The standards are individ-
"°See Table II (e), (), as compared to (g).
"See Table 11 (e).
3 These three cases involved five defendants as recorded
in Table II (g).
J. A. GILBOY [Vol. 67
PLEA NEGOTIATIONS AND THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
ually set by him without review by his superiors and
without fear of censure if he deviates from them.
While it seemed clear that the supervisor had a
stated policy concerning plea negotiations in narcot-
ics cases, the approaches and practices of his assist-
ants in court varied significantly. Practices of some
assistants were very similar to those of the supervi-
sor. These assistants indicated that their sentencing
offers were based on the defendant's background and
the offense which he had committed, and not on
whether a motion to suppress had been or would be
made. One assistant explained his practice not in
terms of fairness but by saying that he had no
opportunity to do otherwise. Defense lawyers in
court were accustomed first to litigating their mo-
tions to suppress in narcotics cases, and then to
approaching him to discuss an offer only after they
had lost on the motion. This assistant indicated that
in cases where he might be interested in making a
better offer because of the unlikelihood of success on
the motion, the fact that defense lawyers approached
him only after the motion was lost prevented him
from doing so:
In one case a lawyer came up to me after he had lost
his motion. It was a motion that could have gone one
way or another, and there was a lot of drugs involved.
I was talking about 5 years probation. If he had come
up to me before the motion I probably would have
been inclined to give him a better offer so that I'd be
assured of the outcome of the case. But as I said we
don't always get an opportunity to do this."3
While the practices of some assistants seem to
parallel those of the supervisor, a contrary policy of
conditioning sentence offers on the foregoing of
evidentiary motions was seen by one assistant as
absolutely essential to controlling the caseload in a
court in which he worked. He noted that when he
first worked in the court, he and the new judge
serving in the court found themselves facing hun-
dreds of charges to be heard each day. In a concerted
effort to relieve the court of this burden, the assistant
state's attorney took a stand that "you can't have
your cake and eat it too." The defense lawyer could
not put on his motion, and then expect his client to be
treated the same way as if the motion had not been
heard. ",
It is, of course, not surprising that standards gen-
33 Interview with an assistant state's attorney, Oct. 10,
1974.
3
1Interview with an assistant state's attorney, Sept.
30, 1974. The attractiveness of a guilty plea offer which an
assistant may make is restrained by the supervisor's plea
negotiation guidelines. See note 19 supra.
erated by the assistants on this matter would vary
substantially in the absence of an established, com-
prehensive policy. The differing practices reflect
different personal temperaments and attitudes, as
well as different assessments of the practical necessi-
ties of the situation.
In sum, prosecutorial practices regarding plea
negotiation and evidentiary claims in the Chicago
branch courts do not fit into any simple pattern. The
supervisor, who handles plea negotiations in major
cases, had a stated policy of conducting such plea
negotiations independently of evidentiary claims; his
offers were not dependent on or affected by whether
motions to suppress were or were not made. Other
evidence indicates that the supervisor generally fol-
lows this policy. However, since it is entirely his own
policy he is free to, and occasionally does, disregard
it. The assistants who handle plea negotiations in
less serious cases felt free to devise their own policies,
despite the fact that their supervisor had formulated
a stated policy. The results ranged from practices
consistent with the supervisor's to a directly opposite
approach of deliberately inhibiting and penalizing
the making of motions to suppress through offering
harsher sentences if they were made.
"SITUATIONAL" CONCESSIONS INHERENT IN
FELONY PLEA NEGOTIATION AT THE
BRANCH COURT LEVEL
The foregoing discussion is incomplete because it
focuses on the branch court as a self-contained unit of
the criminal process. In addition to examining the
question of whether the prosecutor conditions sen-
tencing offers on the foregoing of motions to suppress
at that stage, it is necessary to consider the general
pattern of plea bargaining practices in the criminal
process which cause the issue to be raised at the
branch court level in the first place. While prosecu-
tors may "allow" motions to suppress to be litigated
at the branch court level, this may be of less
significance than the impact of plea bargaining
practices which severely inhibit a defense lawyer
from litigating such evidentiary issues at the trial
level.
One very distinctive characteristic of the Chicago
narcotics branch courts is their role as the court of
final disposition for felony cases. " This includes not
3-Table I contains data useful in answering the ques-
tion as to what extent the branch court serves as the court
of final disposition for narcotics felony charges. Although
the number of felony charges not disposed of in the branch
court is known (i.e., the 136 charges bound over to the
grand jury), the total number of felony charges initially
filed in the branch court can only be estimated. This is
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only the dismissal and discharge of felony cases, but
also a use of the branch court as a central forum for
pleas of guilty to felony informations and to mis-
demeanor charges reduced from felony charges. '
This characteristic of narcotics cases in the branch
court reflects in part the pervasive influence of the
prosecutor's policies concerning plea negotiation.
The state's attorney's office has a well-known pol-
icy of making its most attractive sentence offers
at the branch court level, and it is generally agreed
that prosecutors at the trial level will not "un-
dercut" offers made at the branch level.37 De-
fense lawyers anticipate that if their client does not
take the state's sentencing offer on a plea of guilty at
the branch level, they may sometimes receive the
same, but in no event a more lenient, offer at the trial
level; in most cases the offer at the trial level will be
more severe.
These plea bargaining practices which tend to
force disposition of felony narcotics cases at the
branch court level of the criminal justice system, as
because the categories of "dismissal" and "motions to
suppress/to quash sustained" in Table I include both
felony and misdemeanor charges. An estimate of the
number of felony charges disposed of at the branch court
level can be obtained by examining three categories con-
taining only felony charges: (1) cases "held to the grand
jury," (2) pleas of guilty to "felony informations," and (3)
cases with a finding of no probable cause at a preliminary
hearing. Using this data as a conservative estimate it can be
stated that 66 per cent of the felony charges were disposed of
at the branch court level.
Available for one court (Branch Court 25) from the
Daily Court Sheets for November-December 1973 is
information on the number of felony charges reduced to
misdemeanors in the branch courts. Using this information,
as a conservative estimate 84 per cent of the felony charges
were disposed of in the branch court. See Table III.361d.
"During plea negotiations this policy was articulated by
the supervisor to defense lawyers who hesitated about their
client taking a particular offer at the branch court level. It is
a general office policy, and mentioned as such during a
speech by Geno De Vito (Deputy State's Attorney Criminal
Prosecutions Bureau, Cook County State's Attorney's
Office) at the Seminar on Plea Bargaining presented by the
Chicago Council of Lawyers and the Lawyer's Committee
for Civil Rights Under Law, Oct. 2, 1974, at the Mid-
land Hotel, Chicago, Illinois.
Intensified plea negotiation at this stage is only one
reason cases are negotiated and motions litigated. Public
defenders and private lawyers indicated to the researcher
that there is no reason to pursue cases at the trial court level
if the case isn't very serious, e.g., a minor offense and a
defendant with a minor criminal background. It is expected
in such cases that probation or probation with time served
will be offered by the prosecutor in return for a guilty plea
and that this will be acceptable to the accused.
TABLE III
BRANCH 25 FELONY CHARGES DISPOSED IN THE BRANCH
COURT OR BOUND OVER TO THE GRAND JURY
PerNo. Cent
Held to the Grand Jury 57 16.29
Pleas of Guilty to Felony Informations 108 30.86
Findings of No Probable Cause 71 20.29
Pleas of Guilty to Misdemeanors Reduced 114 32.57
from Felonies
350 100.01
opposed to the trial court level, may significantly
weaken the threat of excluding evidence illegally
seized by the police. In cases in which evidentiary
motions are litigated at the branch court stage the
defense lawyers' opportunity to familiarize them-
selves prior to the hearing of the motion with facts
relevant to the allegedly illegal search is substantially
reduced. This is particularly true when attempting to
identify possible police perjury and bring it to the
attention of the court.
In raising motions to suppress in the branch court
defense lawyers are initially hampered by the ab-
sence of formal discovery at that stage. " In narcotics
cases probably the most important item to be
"discovered" by the defense is the police officer's case
report, which is a one-page or longer narrative
explaining why the defendant was .arrested and
searched. Without having seen this report it is
difficult for a defense lawyer to make a motion to
suppress because he does not know the circumstances
of the arrest and search, except for his client's limited
knowledge, and cannot foresee the possible problems.
3 8Discovery in felony criminal cases in Illinois is
governed by provisions of the Illinois Supreme Court Rules.
These provisions specifically state that the discovery rules
"shall become applicable following indictment or informa-
tion and shall not be operative prior to or in the course of
any preliminary hearing." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, § 411
(1975). If a defense lawyer's motion to suppress evidence is
denied at the branch court level he may be allowed by the
trial judge to again raise the motion if new information has
come to his attention from the formal discovery. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 114-12 (1975). In the absence of this new
information a lawyer may not re-litigate the issue. People v.
Holland, 56 II. 2d 319, 307 N.E.2d 380 (1974). The
problem for defense lawyers is that if at the branch court
level they do not have the police reports, for example, they
will be unaware of discrepancies, if any, between the
contents of the reports and the police officer's testimony on
the motion to suppress evidence. As a result, they might
encourage a client to plead guilty at that stage when the
person might otherwise have a substantial issue to litigate in
the trial court.
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Further, the possession of this report allows a
comparison of the written report with the oral
testimony of the police officer, thereby providing
some means of determining and possibly challenging
the officer's credibility.3 9 Given the indications of
widespread police perjury in narcotics cases, this is
by no means a small matter."'
While there are no formal rules governing discov-
ery at the branch court level in Illinois, there have
emerged a set of informal discovery practices of the
prosecutors in the narcotics court which rest entirely
upon prosecutorial discretion so that discovery may
be granted or withheld depending on the prosecutor's
assessments of the type of case, the defendant, and the
defense lawyer. As a result, some lawyers are more
handicapped than others in litigating motions to
suppress in the branch courts. The state's attorneys
always give the public defender copies of the police
reports. 1 Some private lawyers are able to obtain the
reports directly from the arresting or other police
officers. 2 Assistant state's attorneys in the narcotics
39The police report, however, may also be written so as
to conceal or reveal certain aspects of the arrest and search
situation. See Manning, Police Lying, 3 URBAN LIFE &
CULTURE 283, 297-98 (Oct. 1974).
"°See generally P. CHEVIGNY, POLICE POWER: POLICE
ABUSES IN NEW YORK CrrY 180-218 (1969); J. SKOLNICK,
JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMO-
CRATIC SOCIETY 214-15 (1966); Cohen, Police Perjury: An
Interview with Martin Garbus, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 363
(1972); Kajlan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26
STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1033 (1974); Oaks, supra note 3, at
739-42; Comment, Effect of Mapp v. Ohio on Police
Search-and-Seizure Practices in Narcotics Cases, 4 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PROB. 87, 95-96 (1968); Comment, Police
Perjury in Narcotics "Dropsy" Cases: A New Credibility
Gap, 60 GEO. L.J. 507 (1971). For a discussion of the
types of lies common to police work see generally Manning,
supra note 39.
4Various reasons were given to the researcher by dif-
ferent prosecutors for this practice. Some mention "cour-
tesy," reflecting an appreciation of the pressure placed
on the public defender since he represents defendants on
the day of his appointment to the case. Others acknowl-
edge that public defenders may choose to continue
cases in order to prepare their case unless the state's
attorney provides such a "courtesy." Some assistants
mentioned the naivet6 of the public defenders and their
willingness to believe what their clients say. If shown the
police report they have a more realistic view of the case
against their client and are more likely to settle the case at
the branch court stage.
42 It was commonly acknowledged by prosecutors that
some defense lawyers were able to obtain police reports
through their "contacts" in the police department. The
prosecutors in the narcotics court took the position that
where this happened it was not important since the
attorneys were going to receive the reports shortly at the
trial level in any event.
court will also give private defense lawyers the
reports. However, the defense lawyer must be knowl-
edgeable enough to know that he may request the
report, since the report is usually not offered to him
by the prosecutor. 43 Further, not every defense
lawyer will have the opportunity to see the police
reports even if he requests them. Some state's
attorneys mentioned the names of defense lawyers to
whom they would not give the reports because they
believed the defense already had an advantage since
these lawyers were veterans of the court, and were
litigating against fairly inexperienced prosecutors.
Other assistants mentioned that they refused to give
reports to lawyers they felt had been "difficult" to
deal with in court.
Even for defense lawyers who do obtain the police
reports, the practice of pointing up discrepancies
between the report and what the officer has testified
to on the motion to suppress is almost unheard of in
the branch court. Some defense lawyers are reluctant
to do so because they are unwilling to acknowledge
that they have access to these reports when they have
not obtained them from the prosecutor. But even
where the prosecutor has provided the reports, as in
the case of the public defender, it is understood that
the reports are not to be used in court for impeach-
ment purposes, since the defense lawyers are not le-
gally entitled to have the reports at this stage.
Nevertheless, the reports may still have some im-
pact in dealing with possible perjury. In some of the
observed cases the question of the officer's veracity
was considered after the preliminary hearing by the
defense lawyer, the prosecutor, and the judge in the
judges' chambers on the basis of the police report
in an attempt by the defense lawyer to have the case
dismissed. In other cases defense lawyers were ob-
served discussing with the supervisor in his office
a comparison of the police report and the police
officer's testimony in the hope of getting the
supervisor to dismiss the case. 14
When defense lawyers raise their evidentiary
claims at the branch level, there is a second impor-
4
3 In some cases where the prosecutor is particularly
interested in the conviction of the defendent but feels he has
a weak case, he may attempt to encourage-plea negotiation
discussions at the branch court level by offering the police
reports to the defense lawyer.
44 The supervisor did not object to continuances between
the time there was a finding of probable cause and a binding
over for presentment to the grand jury if the defense lawyer
wanted to have time to obtain a copy of the preliminary
hearing transcript for the purpose of pointing out to the
supervisor the discrepancies between the police officer's
reports and testimony at the hearing.
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tant disadvantage-the preliminary hearing is usu-
ally not used to prepare the motion. 45 In contrast,
when motions to suppress are made at the trial level
the preliminary hearing is used in two ways.46 First,
at the hearing there is an attempt by the defense
lawyer to better familiarize himself with the case by
eliciting information from witnesses about poten-
tially illegal aspects of the arrest or search. Second,
the questioning is used to elicit testimony by the
police officer relating to the motion to suppress which
may be a more spontaneous and truthful narration
than is possible after the police officer has been
coached by the prosecutor at the trial court level." 7
The inability to utilize police reports and the
preliminary hearing as a means of dealing with
potential perjury may be of particular significance in
narcotics cases. Police perjury has most often been
"In narcotics cases if a plea of guilty is expected to be
entered at the branch court stage by the defendant, usually
the preliminary hearing is not used by the defense as a
discovery tool for preparation in making a motion to
suppress. Instead, counsel proceeds directly to a hearing on
the motion and waives the preliminary hearing. Apart from
a very small number of lawyers, most practitioners do not
proceed with the preliminary hearing; consequently, they
do not at some point during that hearing after the officer's
testimony relating to the arrest and search, make a motion
to suppress the evidence. The reason for this is not
altogether clear. Some apprehension was expressed to the
researcher by one defense lawyer regarding the reaction of
judges and prosecutors to a regular usage of the preliminary
hearing by defense counsel to develop a better sense of the
case before making a motion to suppress during the
preliminary hearing. He felt that these persons would be
upset with him because they prefer to handle only one
matter, either the hearing or motion, at a time.
Moreover, another barrier to utilizing the preliminary
hearing as a discovery device in making motions at the
branch level is that at least one of the two judges considers
the motion "untimely" if made after the preliminary
hearing in the branch court. If the case is continued to
another date after the preliminary hearing, the judge will
not allow attorneys to make their motions on that later date.
16 If the defense anlicipates that a case will be bound over
for presentment to the grand jury, it will usually delay the
filing of any motions to suppress in order to use the
preliminary hearing to prepare the motion, and will litigate
the issue after full discovery at the trial level.
"Its use as a means of "discovering" the prosecutor's
case and "perpetuating" testimony for impeachment pur-
poses are well recognized collateral functions of the prelimi-
nary hearing. See generally F. MILLER, supra note 26, at
72-74; Wald, Poverty and Criminal Justice, in PRESI-
DENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND AD-
MINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE
COURTS 143 (1967); Graham & Letwin, The Preliminary
Hearing in Los Angeles: Some Field Findings and Legal-
Policy Observations, 18 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 916-31 (1971).
identified and discussed in connection with the
fabrication of grounds for street arrests in narcotics
cases. Particularly, police testimony in court that
defendants abandoned the contraband has led a
number of commentators to conclude that the police
are constructing a set of circumstances to circumvent
the requirements of the fourth amendment.48 Others
fear police perjury may be involved in the process of
issuing warrants to search houses for contraband. To
establish the "probable cause" necessary to have a
warrant issued, it is believed that a police officer may
lie in a sworn affidavit about the existence of an
informant or may fabricate information about the
informant's actual reliability. 4
CONCLUSION
This study of practices in the Chicago narcotics
branch courts clearly does not support the specula-
tion and fear of some commentators that prosecutors
may be inclined to use the plea bargaining process as
a means of inducing wholesale abandonment of
claims under the exclusionary rule. The supervising
state's attorney in the branch courts had a stated
policy, which he appeared to follow in almost all
cases, of making sentencing offers independent of
whether motions to suppress evidence would or
would not be made at the branch court level. The
supervisor's assistants who handled plea bargaining
in less important cases followed various practices and
were not subject to any overall policy directive.
Of possibly greater significance is the overall
policy of the state's attorney's office of inducing plea
bargaining at the branch court stage. Thus, while
defendants may not be induced to forego their
motions to suppress at that stage, they are clearly
induced to make the motions only at that stage. This
means that motions may have to be made without the
benefit of police reports, as well as the testimony
recorded at the preliminary hearing. This, in turn,
makes it more difficult to deal with the problem of
police perjury. If that problem is a serious one, as
many suggest, then it is possible that the plea
bargaining process-by compelling the litigation of
evidentiary issues at a stage where the means to deal
with them are unavailable-may have a significant
effect on the efficacy of the exclusionary rule.
4
1Cohen, supra note 40, at 365-67; Comment, Effect oJ
Mapp v. Ohio on Police Search-and-Seizure Practices in
Narcotics Cases, supra note 40; Comment, Police Perjury
in Narcotics "Dropsy" Cases: A New Credibility Gap,
supra note 40.
"P. CHEVIGNY, supra note 40, at 215-17.
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